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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
PlaintiftfAppellee, : Case No. 990531-CA 
v. : 
JOSEPH GALLEGOS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(1) & (4)(c) (Supp. 1999) (in Add. A).1 This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the plea bargain reached between the State and co-defendant violate 
defendant's state constitutional right to call witnesses on his behalf at trial? 
defendant was also convicted of interfering with an arresting officer, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999), but does not challenge 
that conviction or sentence in this appeal. 
Further, section 58-37-8 was amended in 1999, after the offense at issue occurred. 
However, those changes do not affect the determination of this case. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Because defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal and fails to argue 
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, his claim does not warrant appellate 
review and no standard of review applies. 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that defendant 
possessed the methamphetamine and that the officers could see defendant's conduct in the 
dark? 
Because defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal and fails to argue 
either plain error or exceptional circumstances, his claim does not warrant appellate 
review and no standard of review applies. 
3. Has defendant met his burden of showing that his trial counsel performed 
deficiently in not calling defendant's sister-in-law or another police suspect to testify to 
peripheral and cumulative matters at trial? 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Maestas, 2000 
UT App 22,111, 997 P.2d 314; State v. Gallegos. 967 P.2d 973, 975-76 (Utah App. 
1998); State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). Where, as here, the record is 
insufficient to permit review, the claim is not reviewed on appeal and no standard of 
review applies. See State v. Hopkins. 1999 UT 98, f 13, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 15. 
2 
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CONSTITUTIONAL Fku t 
Tin luiliiiM. im> n uii'ililulinii.ii pirn i IIKIIIS -ire ivin am to the issues on appeal: 
Utah Const a r t 1, § *-. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before 'final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASK 
Defendant s\d> dliai^ui n • 11 • (HISMNMOII ol ,m n ontmllnl iiilistann v^. if li I he iiilcni lo 
distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) & (4)(c) 
(Supp. 1999), and interfering with an airesting officer, a class B misdemeanor : r 
violation of Utah Code Mm JU5(19^ IDAUU 
day trial, the ^ fendant filed multiple 
3 
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pro-se motions challenging his trial counsel's effectiveness and the veracity of the State's 
witnesses (R. 35-38, 112-14, 119-20, 126-28, 129-39, 155-56, 167-68, 169-72). All 
motions were denied, and the trial court sentenced defendant to serve five-years-to-life 
for the first degree felony and 180 days for the class B misdemeanor (R. 160-61). 
Defendant timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Melissa Melcher began working the comer of 25th and Monroe Streets 
shortly before nine p.m. the evening of June 20, 1998 (R. 228:10, 12, 23, 68).2 She was 
part of a group of five officers working a reverse prostitution sting aimed at those who 
solicit prostitutes (R. 228:11, 22, 67). As part of the operation, Melcher was wearing a 
wire which allowed an officer waiting in one of the two unmarked police vehicles nearby 
to hear her conversations with others (R. 228:22, 27-28, 70). When she was ready for the 
officers to appear and make an arrest, she would give a pre-arranged "bust signaP'-saying 
"Father's Day" and removing her purse from her shoulder (R. 228:16-17). 
It was still daylight around 9:15 p.m. when Darlene Lucero approached Melcher 
(R. 228:12, 24-25). Lucero asked if Melcher was a snitch, then proceeded to offer 
"protection" services to Melcher (R. 228: 14, 29, 58-59, 69). Lucero then asked if 
Melcher knew of anyone wanting to buy methamphetamine (R. 228:12, 30). Melcher said 
2Transcripts are cited by the volume number stamped on the cover of each 
transcript volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 277: 7. 
4 
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"no" but she was interested in buying a "teener" for herself (R. 228: Lucero 
agreed, but said that she would have to get 
JfifersiiHii i K VS I J> Ui» sin* said she'd be back in fifteen minutes or Melcher could 
find her at 26th and Jefferson (R. 228:12). 
The sting operation continued, but Lucero did not return (R. 228 3.v he 
officers eventually decided to relocate In (lit i unit i of Ni,h ,m<l Idfn villi i 
36 3 7. 71 98) Fifteen minutes later, as it was beginning to get dark, Melcher saw Lucero 
and defendant coming toward her down the opposite side of the street a block away (R. 
228:14, 26-27, 38-39). When they reached Melcher, she was already talking to a man 
i Ii : • A as also iiiterested mi litis mil1 ii Icnin nil R ,??K'3 "• W ' I I Melcher asked about the 
i •*,.-. and Lucero asked defendant if they should sell Melcher two teeners (R. 228:14-15, 
43). Defendant agreed to the sale, and, at Lucero's urging, the group walked a short 
distance down the block, away from a streetlight (K ! "(' " \ II M "», 0(« ,! i \\ II c I I  11 
s t o p p e d ( l i t ,L»I mi IIIII I  IIII Ml |i i II ii i l , i i ii II II if,' t v u i ( i h c involved in the reverse sting 
operation, saying she wanted to get the deal done so she could attend to business (R. 
228:15, 44. 74) Defendant agreed to do it there, commenting to Lucero, "Stop making 
such a commotion and attracting all 
Defendant opened the black fanny pack hanging at the front of his waist, pulled two 
A teener" is a small amount of drugs for personal use, generally worth about 
$20.00 (R. 228:31-32). 
5 
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baggies of methamphetamine out, and gave them both to Lucero (R. 228:15, 42, 45-46). 
While the pack was open, Melcher saw several more baggies in it, all resembling the ones 
defendant had removed (R. 228:46-47). Lucero held up the baggies and flicked them 
with her fingers (R. 228:15, 46, 74). Melcher gave the pre-arranged "bust signal" (R. 
228:15,48). 
Detective Steve Zaccardi and Officer Wayne Smith were in the unmarked car next 
to Melcher and her group (R. 228:74-75, 127). From his position in the front seat of the 
car, Zaccardi observed defendant and Lucero approach Melcher and the unknown male, 
saw the group walk toward the car and stop right next to it, then saw Lucero holding up 
the baggies (R. 228:72-74). He did not see how the individuals were dressed because of 
the darkness and the streetlight behind them; his position prevented him from seeing 
where Lucero got the baggies (R. 228:98-102). As he watched, he listened to the 
conversation on Melcher's wire (R. 228:72-74). 
Officer Smith was writing a citation in the back seat of the unmarked car with a 
suspect they had arrested earlier (R. 228:75, 127). He was approximately four feet from 
defendant and could see defendant take something out of a fanny pack he wore and hand 
it to a female (R. 228:129-30, 133-34). He heard a male voice say that they would do the 
deal (R. 228:134). 
When Lucero held up the baggies, both officers stepped out of the car (R. 228:76). 
Zaccardi drew his gun, identified himself, and told the group to get on the ground (R. 
6 
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228:49, 76). Defendant ran (R. : . * oth Zaccardi and Smiu R. 
2 2 X 7 f> " 1 \ I in il I n in i\ I • \ i 'i I i in i in i in iidentified man with Melcher ran in another direction, 
and Melcher yelled at Smith to follow him (R. 228:51-52, 131). Seeing the officers were 
busy, Lucero started to walk in another direction but was stopped by Melcher and arrested 
(R. 228:18). 
i diT.iid Ii '-I ili ii'.l I. f'lti •mil followed defendant (R. 228:76, 84). As they ran, 
Zaccardi noticed defendant making broad gestures with his arms, moving them toward his 
waistband then out again, as if he might have a weapon (R. 228:85, 1Q5-06). However, it 
was dark by this time so that the detective could i Pendant's 
inovmk'iits K , / K ill i ^ >»,, S?,60,98, 103). Zaccardi followed defendant from no • 
more than 25 feet away (R. 228:104-05). Defendant stepped in a hole and fell near a curb 
(R. 228:77, 106). Zaccardi reached him as he was getting up, pushed him down and tried 
to subdue him as he actively resisted (K 228" ? ' /H lllliii \ '-rumd nlfu'i r arrived 
together they cuffed defendant (R. 228:77, 84, 107). Zaccardi then noticed the fanny 
pack (R. 228:85). 
They took defendant back to the unmarked car, and Melcher asked 4 " doi .n ill I II v 
II i Il lounJ moi ' IlKiggic,1'. inn the fanny pack (R, 228:18, 86, 108). Zaccardi reported that 
the pack was empty (R. 228:86, 108). Melcher insisted that she had seen them, so the 
officers took their flashlights and retraced their steps, finding two baggies of 
methamphetamine along the path defendant had 
7 
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Meanwhile, Melcher had found the baggies Lucero had been holding on the ground 
where the group had stopped to conduct the sale (R. 228: 18, 86-87). 
Melcher took defendant to the hospital to be treated for various small lacerations 
and pains, and then took him to jail for booking (R. 228:52-54). She filled out the 
necessary paperwork concerning defendant's personal property but did not list the black 
fanny pack as it was not there at that time (R. 228:55-56, 87). Zaccardi stayed at the 
scene to prepare his written report, field tested the drugs at his office, then placed the 
drugs into evidence (R. 228:86, 94, 112). He also had defendant's fanny pack, eyeglasses 
and hat, but decided that they were not needed in evidence (R. 228:87). He drove the 
items to the jail at three in the morning and left them to be put with defendant's other 
belongings as defendant had already been booked and the paperwork completed (R. 
228:87, 112, 114). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I: Prior to trial, defendant's co-defendant, Lucero, entered into a plea 
agreement in which she agreed that, if called to testify at defendant's trial, she would say 
that 'the version [of events] that the State has in the police reports is accurate as to her 
involvement[.]" Defendant claims that this condition of the plea agreement violated his 
right to compel a witness to testify in his behalf. This challenge does not warrant < 
appellate review because defendant failed to raise this objection below, depriving the trial 
court of the opportunity to develop the record concerning the propriety of the agreement. 
8 
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Further, defendant fails to argue plain error on appeal. Even under the plain error 
doctrine, defendant's claim of error fails because the terms oi flic .igttTitiail t!«i i i l 
obviously requ stand and lie. Moreover, to the extent 
defendant challenges the State's ability to use a plea bargain to ensure truthful testimony, 
his claim must fail because he has no right to present perjured testimony. 
Point II us Court should refuse to address defendant 
evidence h a argument to the trial court and does not argue 
plain error on appeal Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury 's 
verdict. Defendant was linked to the baggies of methamphetamine by: testimony from an 
eyewitness who saw the baggies in a fanny pack defends 
11 e f en da 111' ^  11 a 11111« <\ ^  11 e handed two baggies to his co-defendant; and testimony of 
another eyewitness who saw defendant making arm gestures near the fanny pack at his 
waist as he ran from the police; and testimony that immediately after defendant's arrest, 
the officers located two more baggj ^fendant had 
(a I that there was some visibility even though it was dark at the time of 
defendant's arrest was established by the consistent testimony of the officers as to their 
ability to see that defendant was one of the people who met M ill I HI m < i I1 In, Ilk I u l l u l In 
rm movements as he ran, and that he tripped in a 
gutter and fell immediately prior to his arrest. Defendant confirmed that the darkness did 
not wholly eliminate visibility when he testified that he could see Officer Melcher's body 
9 
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movements from a short distance away as well as the officers as they emerged from the 
car parked at the curb. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that the officers 
could see the basic events about which they testified, despite the darkness. 
Point III: Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fails because 
defendant does not establish the requisite prejudice arising from his counsel's alleged 
failure to investigate and call at trial two potential defense witnesses. Defendant makes 
no prejudice argument as to one witness. The minimal argument he presents as to the 
second witness fails to acknowledge that her proposed testimony would not negate an 
element of the crime and would still require the jury to weigh conflicting evidence as to 
the existence of the black fanny pack. In light of the substantial testimony against 
defendant, it is not reasonably likely that the outcome would have been more favorable to 
defendant had the witness testified. 
Further, the record is inadequate to support the claims as it does not establish that 
defendant's counsel conducted no investigation or that the witnesses would testify as 
defendant speculates. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
THIS COURT NEED NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE 
TO THE TERMS OF HIS CO-DEFENDANT'S PLEA BARGAIN AS 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO OBJECT BELOW AND DOES NOT 
ARGUE PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL; EVEN UNDER THE PLAIN 
ERROR DOCTRINE, THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS ERROR 
Defendant argues that he was denied his right to compel witnesses on his own 
behalf by the State's plea bargain with his co-defendant, Darlene Lucero. Br. of Aplt. at 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1115. Specifically, he claims that by including in the plea agreement the requirement 
thatif Lucero tpnk llu1 sland, slu '>"i""Ui"U f«/\H«, • *• ii•, flu! tin p"(iu (t:poi1snnn ,iu mule, 
the State effectively tampered with her testimony, thereby preventing her from testifying 
on defendant's behalf about what happened that night. Br. of Aplt. at 12-15.4 
Generally, claims not raised before the trial court, even constitutional ones may 
not . ->ee State v. Holeate, • - * 104 Utah Aii\ Rep. 3; 
State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998). An exception exists where plain error or 
exceptional circumstances can be established. See Holgate, at Tfl 1. To establish plain 
error, defendant must show that an error occurred, it should ha^ ii 
, u 111 ,i 11J 11 w i I M f i! 11111 • " • 11 •• i • i M the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome for defendant. See id. at 1(13. 
Defendant raises this argument for the first time on appeal, despite having 
knowledge before trial of the terms of the plea bargain and jiiipli nppi >IMIMH '• |«»««)>!»)r<t 
.
1
" vs 2, S-6-defense i otiose! was present at Lucero's change of plea hearing and ' • 
acknowledges defendant's intent up to that time to rely on Lucero's testimony at trial; 
236:3-4-defendant admits discussing Lucero's plea with counsel but makes no objection). 
I! I it la i k ml i in in ili|t"* liiiii i in 11 In (II III in I mi in ill (I (I mi mi mi 1 (ill I lie opportune 
regarding the veracity of the anticipated testimony and the propriety of the agreement. 
4Defendant presents only a state constitutional argument, invoking Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution involving compelling the attendance of witnesses. 
Br of Aplt at 14-15. 
11 
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Further, defendant fails to argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
Accordingly, this Court should refuse to review his claim of error on appeal. See State v. 
BeUo, 871 P.2d 584, 587-88, n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to reach a constitutional 
claim for the first time on appeal absent a plain error argument). 
Even under the plain error doctrine, defendant's claim fails. Defendant's argument 
assumes that the plea bargain bound Lucero to lie on the stand or at least bound her to 
refrain from elaborating on the truth.5 The record does not support that position. The 
terms of the plea bargain, as represented to the trial court, were: 
[PROSECUTOR]... Ms. Lucero will agree [that]... the State's version of the 
facts, implicating the codefendant[,] is accurate, and that . . . , if subpoenaed to 
testify, [she will not ] . . . testify that the codefendant is innocent. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] And her understanding - that is accurate, Your Honor. 
Her understanding is she - while she's accepting this negotiation in exchange for -
this negotiation in exchange for her testimony, what she would say if called to 
testify is that the version that the State has in the police reports is accurate as to 
her involvement and that is all the testimony she would give, Your Honor. 
(R. 235:4-5) (emphasis added) (in Add. B). 
The agreement does not contemplate that Lucero would testify as to the accuracy 
of the State's portrayal ofdefendant's involvement in the crime. Neither does it, on its 
face, suggest that Lucero do anything more than tell the truth about her own involvement. 
5To the extent defendant is arguing that the State is without authority to ensure that 
a co-defendant will provide truthful testimony by making it a condition of a plea 
agreement, his claim fails. The challenged agreement would not impinge on any 
recognized right because defendant has no right to present perjured testimony. 
12 
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Such an agreement is wholly appropriate and did not deprive defendant of the right to call 
Lucero. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997) ("A plea agreement 
requiring truthful testimony does not deprive a defendant of a potential witness or render 
the testimony inherently unreliable"). The fact that the court, the prosecutor, and two 
defense counsel, all present in open court at the time the plea agreement was presented, 
saw nothing wrong with this condition and did not thereafter develop any more of a 
record on it suggests that they all believed it to be an appropriate agreement designed to 
have the witness testify truthfully about her own actions on the night in question. 
Defendant provides no basis upon which to assume otherwise. Accordingly, even under 
the plain error doctrine, the terms of the plea agreement were not obviously erroneous, 
and defendant's claim of a state constitutional violation fails. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO 
PRESENT THE ARGUMENT TO THE TRIAL COURT AND DOES 
NOT ARGUE PLAIN ERROR ON APPEAL; ALTERNATIVELY, 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
VERDICT 
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.6 
He claims that the evidence was too inconsistent to support a conviction and cites the 
6As stated in footnote 1, supra, defendant challenges only his conviction of 
possession with intent to distribute. He does not challenge his conviction for interfering 
with an arresting officer. 
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absence of evidence linking the baggies of methamphetamine to him and the lack of 
evidence that the officers could see what was happening in the dark. Br. of Aplt. at 11, 
19. This Court should refuse to reach the merits of his claim because it is raised for the 
first time on appeal. Alternatively, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
sufficient evidence existed to connect defendant and the drugs and to establish that the 
officers could see defendant's conduct in the dark. 
A. The Insufficiency Claim has Not Been Preserved 
Claims not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal absent evidence 
of plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Hokate. 2000 UT 74, f 11; 404 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3. This includes claims of insufficient evidence. Id. at ff 14-17. Defendant 
failed to raise below the two alleged deficiencies he briefs on appeal. Instead, he 
repeatedly argued to the trial court in various guises his claims of perjury and ineffective 
assistance of counsel (R. 35-38, 112-14, 119-20, 126-35, 141-42, 167-72). Even his post-
trial motion for a new trial, which summarily claimed that the evidence was insufficient to 
justify the verdict, failed to identify the alleged insufficiencies he briefs on appeal (R. 
169-72). Further, defendant did not move to dismiss at the end of the State's case for lack 
of a prima facie case. 
Moreover, defendant makes no plain error argument to this Court. To establish 
plain error for his claim of insufficient evidence, defendant would have to show not only 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, but that the "insufficiency 
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was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the 
jury." Holgate, at ^ |17, No such argument appears in defendant's brief. Accordingly, this 
Court should refuse to reach defendant's claim of insufficient evidence. See State v. 
Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 587-88 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (refusing to reach claim of 
constitutional error for first time on appeal absent plain error or exceptional 
circumstances argument). 
IL On the Merits, There was Sufficient Evidence to Support the Verdict 
Should this Court reach the merits of defendant's claim, it will find sufficient 
evidence to establish each of the points defendant claims are unsupported. 
Under the plain error doctrine, defendant has the burden of establishing "first that 
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that 
the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting 
the case to the jury." Holgate, at 1J17. This Court will find evidence to be insufficient 
when, after viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence "'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable such that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, at |^18 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). If this Court finds the 
evidence to be insufficient, it must then determine whether the defect was "so obvious 
and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. 
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First, defendant alleges a lack of evidence linking him to the baggies of 
methamphetamine found at the scene. Br. of Aplt. at 19. Contrary to his claim, there was 
sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine that he possessed the 
methamphetamine with the requisite intent. Two officers saw him take baggies from the 
fanny pack he was wearing and give them to Lucero (R. 228:15, 46, 133-34). Two 
baggies were found on the ground where the transaction occurred immediately after 
defendant and Lucero were apprehended (R. 228:18, 86-87). Officer Melcher testified 
that before defendant ran, she saw more baggies in defendant's fanny pack when he 
removed the two he gave to Lucero (R. 228:45-47). All the officers testified that 
defendant, Lucero, and the unknown white male took off in different directions (R. 
228:16, 49-52, 76-77, 131). Detective Zaccardi, who was no more than 25 feet behind 
defendant at the furthest, testified that defendant made several movements with his hands 
at the front of his waistband during the chase (R. 228:85, 104-06).7 After defendant was 
arrested and returned to the scene, Zaccardi found the fanny pack was empty (R. 228:86, 
108). Shortly thereafter, officers found on the ground along the route defendant fled two 
7Defendant erroneously claims that "Officer Zaccardi testified he saw the 
Defendant open up the fanny pack and drop two baggies, even as the chase was on and it 
was totally dark." Br. of Aplt. at 18. Detective Zaccardi testified that "as we were 
running he [defendant] kept putting his hands toward his waistband . . . . his hands kept 
going down [to his waistband] and he would run and then his hands would go back." (R. 
228:85). The Detective made it clear that he discovered the existence of the fanny pack 
only after defendant was handcuffed (id.) and that he did not see defendant drop anything 
during the chase (R. 228:103-06). 
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baggies similar to the others found where the transaction occurred (R. 228:18, 48, 86-87, 
109-10). From this evidence, the jury could infer that defendant had possession of some, 
if not all, of the methamphetamine seized from the scene. 
Second, defendant contends that it was dark when he was arrested and that there 
was no evidence to establish that the police officers used flashlights or had other means 
by which to see what was happening in the dark.8 Br. of Aplt. at 19. The absence of 
artificial light, however, does not mean that nothing could be seen. The evidence was 
undisputed that it was dark when the arrest occurred. While the darkness made it more 
difficult to see details, it did not make it impossible, as the testimony readily established. 
The officers' testimony consistently portrayed the degree of detail which was 
visible in the darkness surrounding defendant's arrest. The transaction occurred near 
11:00 p.m. (R. 228:27-Melcher says around 11:00 p.m.; 228:103-Zaccardi says between 
10:30 and 11:00 p.m.; 228:94, 112-Zaccardi says he wrote his report at the scene at 11:13 
p.m. after everything was finished). Officer Melcher said it was just starting to get dark 
when she saw defendant and Lucero walking toward her a block away (R. 228:15, 26-27). 
By the time defendant ran, she explained that it was dark and she could see only dark 
figures (R. 228:18, 25-26, 52, 60). In the interim, Officer Melcher was standing with 
8Despite defendant's claim that there "was no evidence which showed that any one 
of the officers had a flash light or other mean[s] of illumination" (Br. of Aplt. at 19), 
Officer Melcher testified that once they were alerted to the presence of numerous baggies 
in the fanny pack, the officers began "looking with our flashlights for the drugs" (R. 
228:18). 
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defendant in a tight group of only four people, giving her the best vantage point from 
which to see defendant's actions. She noted that she not only saw him remove two 
baggies from his fanny pack and give them to Lucero, but she also saw more baggies left 
in the pack (R. 228:15, 42,45-47). Nothing in the evidence suggested that it was too dark 
at that point in time for the officer to have seen defendant's actions from such an 
advantageous vantage point. 
Like Officer Melcher, Detective Zaccardi testified that it was just light enough to 
see defendant and Lucero approach Officer Melcher (R. 228:71-74). However, from his 
position in the front driver's seat of the car parked at the curb, he said that he could not 
see the details of the individuals in the group or defendant's clothing as they walked 
toward his car because of the fading light and the streetlight behind them, putting them in 
shadows (R. 228:100-03). He consistently testified that he did not see defendant take 
anything out of a pack or off his person or give anything to someone else, and he did not 
know defendant was wearing a fanny pack until after he had handcuffed him (R. 228:85, 
101-02). He was, however, able to tell when the group stopped next to the car, and he 
saw Lucero hold up the baggies (R. 228:74). He also saw which way defendant ran and, 
as he chased defendant, he was able to see defendant move his hands near his waistband 
and away again but could not see anything drop from defendant's hands (R. 228:105-06). 
He was able to follow defendant's flight, and saw him fall at the curb (id.). His testimony 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made it clear that, although it was hard to see individual detail in the darkness, he was 
able to see shapes and outlines. 
From a slightly different vantage point, Officer Smith was able to see a little more 
before the chase began. He testified that his position in the back seat of Detective 
Zaccardi's car was four feet from the group when they stopped next to the car (R. 
228:127, 133). He was able to see defendant take something out of the fanny pack he was 
wearing and hand it to the female with him (R. 228:129-30, 133-34).9 Smith was not 
involved in the chase beyond the first few steps, so could add nothing relevant after that 
point (R. 228:51-52, 76-77, 131). , 
Even defendant testified that he could see various things despite the darkness. 
Nothing in his testimony contradicts the officers' testimony concerning their ability to see 
various events in the darkness. Defendant claimed that he was walking behind Lucero 
and Officer Melcher and that they were trying to get away from him (R. 228:148, 166). 
His testimony, if credited by the jury, establishes that it was light enough for him to see 
9Defendant mistakenly claims that Officer Smith testified that it was "so dark that 
no witness could see into the vehicle he was riding in[,]" then proceeded to explain to the 
jury how he was able to see defendant take baggies from his fanny pack and give them to 
Lucero. Br. of Aplt. at 18-19. In fact, it was Detective Zaccardi who said that at the time 
the four people stopped next to his car, it was difficult for him to see them which, 
presumably, made it difficult for them to see him (228:103). Zaccardi also said he did not 
see defendant reach into his fanny pack or take anything out of it or give anything to 
anyone else (R. 228:98-102). His testimony is not internally inconsistent. Officer Smith, 
on the other hand, had a slightly different vantage point from the back seat of the car and 
testified consistently as to what he was able to see and hear from his position four feet 
from the group of individuals outside the car (R. 228:75,127, 129-30, 133-34). 
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Officer Melcher's "body movements" and that they "startled" him (R. 228:167-68). He 
saw Officer Melcher walking away from him backwards" (R. 228:168), and, from the 
comer of his eye, he saw Detective Zaccardi emerge from the car at the curb, immediately 
after which the chase began (R. 228:149). He also testified that while he was running, he 
looked back over his shoulder, suggesting that he believed he could see someone behind 
him if he looked, even in the darkness (R. 228:150). His own testimony supports the 
inference from the officers' testimony that it was not so dark that they could not see 
anything. On this evidence, the jury could well infer that the officers could see the basic 
events about which they testified, despite the darkness. Accordingly, defendant's claim 
fails on its merits. 
POINTIII 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS DEFENDANT 
PRESENTS AN INADEQUATE PREJUDICE ARGUMENT; EVEN 
ON THE MERITS, DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS LACK RECORD 
SUPPORT 
Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that he was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel, John Caine, allegedly failed to 
adequately investigate the availability of prospective defense witnesses. Br. of Aplt. at 
19-22. Specifically, he claims that defense counsel failed to investigate the possibility of 
having defendant's sister-in-law testify that defendant did not have a fanny pack when he 
left her house at ten that night, and the suspect sitting in Detective Zaccardi's car testify 
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that it was so dark no one could see anything. Id at 21-22.10 He claims their likely 
testimony was "critical" to the trial and that counsel was deficient for ignoring them. Id 
at 22. This Court need not reach the issue on appeal because defendant presents 
inadequate argument concerning the prejudice he suffered from counsel's alleged 
deficient performance. Moreover, the claim fails on its merits because there is no record 
support for the claim. 
To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 
"show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of 
the trial." State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)); see also State v. Gallegos, 
967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah App. 1998). 
To establish the requisite prejudice, defendant must show that "but for the 
deficient representation, there is a 'reasonable probability' that the result would have been 
different." State v. Hall 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted), cert, 
denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). "'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
10Although defendant repeatedly asserted below that his trial counsel was 
ineffective, he did so either in relation to counsel's failure to act on the allegedly perjured 
testimony given at trial or in summary fashion, claiming a generic failure to investigate 
witnesses without identifying any witness or testimony counsel failed to procure (R. 35-
38, 107-708, 112-14, 119-20, 129-39, 167-68, 169-72; 230:15-21, 26-28). Nowhere does 
the record on appeal mention defendant's sister-in-law or the suspect in Detective 
Zaccardi's car as possible witnesses or the substance of their anticipated testimony. 
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to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct at 2068). 
This Court need not reach the issue of deficient performance when the claim can 
be resolved under the prejudice prong of the test. See State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195, 
1199 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Baker. 963 P.2d 801, 807 (Utah App. 1998). In this 
case, defendant has not argued prejudice from his counsel's alleged failure to investigate 
and call the suspect who sat in Detective Zaccardi's car. Hence, that claim necessarily 
fails. See State v. Seel 827 P.2d 954, 959 (Utah App. 1992) (the mere allegation of 
prejudice is insufficient to permit review of a claim of ineffective assistance). 
The only argument defendant makes as to the absence of his sister-in-law's 
testimony is that, had she corroborated his testimony that he did not have a fanny pack 
that night, "there would have been no evidence for the jury to find the Defendant guilty of 
the information." Br. of Aplt. at 22. However, even if she had testified, as defendant 
claims she might, that he had no fanny pack when he left her apartment that night, that 
would not necessarily establish that he did not have one thereafter when he reached 
Officer Melcher. Defendant was visiting his sister-in-law's house and may well have left 
the pack in his car or Lucero may have had it as they left the apartment. 
Moreover, such testimony would have left the jury with what it already had: 
conflicting information as to whether the fanny pack existed. Given the testimony of 
three officers as to the existence of the pack, Officer Melcher's testimony of its contents, 
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Detective Zaccardi's testimony about defendant's arm movements during the chase, and 
the subsequent discovery of bags of drugs along the route of defendant's attempted 
escape, it is highly unlikely the jury would have found the facts any more favorably 
toward defendant had his sister-in-law testified. It is far from evident that the sister-in-
law's testimony would have changed the outcome of the jury's deliberations. 
The same is to be said about the testimony from the suspect in the police car. Even 
if he had testified that it was too dark to see what was going on, his testimony would have 
been contradicted by defendant's own testimony, which established that he could readily 
see Officer Melcher's conduct, men emerging from the police car, and someone chasing 
him as he ran down the street. Accordingly, defendant cannot establish the requisite 
prejudice to prevail on his claims. 
Even if this Court reviewed the merits of defendant's ineffectiveness claim, it 
would find the claim to be without merit because the record is inadequate to support the 
claim. Where the record underlying a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
inadequate in any fashion, "ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be 
construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively." State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, %% 17-18, Utah Adv. Rep. (dispensing with the preliminary inquiry 
into the adequacy of the record). 
In this case, the record is inadequate in two ways. First, there is nothing on the 
record to establish whether or not defense counsel in fact investigated the witnesses 
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defendant has identified. The mere fact that the record is silent as to whether an 
investigation occurred does not establish that no investigation was in fact undertaken. 
Hence, this Court should presume that counsel conducted a sufficient investigation to 
determine that the witnesses were not necessary to presentation of the defense. 
Second, the record does not reveal what the proposed witnesses would say if they 
had been called to testify. Defendant implies that his sister-in-law knew that he had no 
fanny pack the night of the arrest, but the record does not establish the fact and does not 
demonstrate whether she was available or would, in fact, so testify. Defendant claims 
that the other potential witness "could have been called," and defendant "feels" that he 
would have testified that it was too dark to see anything. Br. of Aplt. at 21. However, the 
record does not establish who he was, whether he was available, or what he would have 
said on the subject. Consequently, on this record, this Court should presume that the 
testimony of these witnesses was not material to the defense and that counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to call them at trial. See Litherland, at 1J17. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction and sentence. 
4 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this d??4Ly of October, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
&7{S£ 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A— Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled sub-
stance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(IXaXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (D(aXiv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
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(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXii) or (2Xa)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (4Xb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4Xa)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
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(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4Xa). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another-state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
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History: L. 1971, ch. 145, ft 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, ft 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, ft 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, ft 3; 1988, ch. 95, ft 1; 
1989, ch. 50, ft 2; 1989, ch. 56, ft 1; 1989, ch. 
178, ft 1; 1989, ch. 187, ft 2; 1989, ch. 201, ft 1; 
1990, ch. 161, ft 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, ft 7; 1995, ch. 284, ft 1; 
1996, ch. 1,5 8; 1997, ch. 64, ft 6; 1998, ch. 
139, ft 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, ft 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former 
Subsection (6) which read: "Any person who 
attempts or conspires to commit any offense 
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction 
guilty of one degree less than the maximum 
penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignat-
ing the other subsections accordingly. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 12, effective May 
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence 
of* for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made 
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and 
(4). 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 303, effective 
May 3, 1999, added Subsection (lKc), redesig-
nating former Subsection (lKc) as (lXd), sub-
stituted "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsec-
tion (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic 
change. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
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Ms. Lucero will plead guilty to an amended charge 
of a possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony. We don't have a problem doing that 
by interlineation, by striking the enhancement and 
the distribution within a thousand feet of the park 
and distribution. Instead, just saying that said 
defendant possessed a controlled substance, to 
wit: Methamphetamine, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Sjogren? 
MS. SJOGREN: That is the agreement, 
Your Honor. And further, the State is of the 
understanding that Ms. Lucero will agree to the 
State's version of the facts, implicating the 
codefendant is accurate, and that she will not 
appear, if subpoenaed to testify, to testify that 
the codefendant is innocent. 
MR. MILES: And her understanding --
that is accurate, Your Honor. Her understanding is 
she -- while she's accepting this negotiation in 
exchange for -- this negotiation in exchange for 
her testimony, what she would say if called to 
testify is that the version that the State has in 
the police reports is accurate as to her 
involvement and that is all the testimony she would 
give, Your Honor. 
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